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1 Introduction
The classical approach to the existence of Nash equilibrium in a normal form game
consists in applying a fixed point theorem to its best-reply correspondence (e.g., Nash
(1950)). When discontinuities on players’ payoff functions prevent this approach from
being used, the classical solution consists in finding conditions that guarantee that
the original game can be suitably approximated by a sequence of sufficiently well-
behaved games in the following sense: a fixed point theorem can be applied to the
best-reply correspondence of each of the approximating games, and the limit points
the resulting Nash equilibria are themselves a Nash equilibrium of the original game
(e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Simon (1987) and Simon and Zame (1990)).
Clearly, an equally suitable approach is to use a fixed point theorem to guarantee
the existence of ε-equilibrium in the approximating games, and to show that limit
points of the resulting ε-equilibria, with ε converging to zero, are themselves a Nash
equilibrium of the original game (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1986)).
In this note, we combine and generalize these ideas in order to obtain an existence
theorem that, when players’ action spaces are metric and locally convex, implies the
main results of Reny (1999) and Carmona (2009), and is equivalent to the general-
ization of Reny’s theorem obtained by Barelli and Soza (2009). In this way, these
results are established in a relatively simple way using the classical ideas mentioned
above.
The use of those classical ideas requires first a generalization of the notion of an
approximate equilibrium. This is done by noting that a Nash equilibrium is a strategy
yielding, to each player, a payoff at least as high as the value of his value function
evaluated at the equilibrium strategies of the other players. Then, our notion of ap-
proximate equilibrium is obtained by replacing, in this definition of Nash equilibrium,
each player’s value function by a function strictly below it and defined also on the
action space of the other players.
The next step in our approach is to define a condition, weak better-reply security,
which guarantees that the original game is suitably approximated by a well-behaved
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game in the following sense: First, players’ value functions in the approximating
game are lower semicontinuous and can therefore be “closely” approximated from
below by continuous functions; second, a fixed point theorem can be applied to a sub-
correspondence of the approximate best-reply correspondence (in the approximating
game) defined using those continuous functions; and, third, every limit point of the
resulting approximate equilibria of the approximating game is a Nash equilibrium of
the original game.
Clearly, this approach corresponds closely to the classical ideas discussed above,
the main difference being that a single game, instead of a sequence of games, is used to
approximate the original game (there are, however, important differences on how the
main steps of the proof are established). As its name suggest, our condition generalizes
the notion of better-reply security of Reny (1999) and is, in fact, equivalent to the
notion of generalized better-reply security of Barelli and Soza (2009). Furthermore,
weak better-reply security also implies the (combined) notion of weak payoff security
and weak upper semicontinuity considered in Carmona (2009). Thus, in the case
where players’ action spaces are metric and locally convex, Theorem 3.1 in Reny
(1999), Corollary 6.8 in Barelli and Soza (2009) and Corollary 2 in Carmona (2009)
can be established using our general existence result, and more importantly, be seen
as a consequence of the classical approach on which our result is based.
The above results of Reny (1999), Barelli and Soza (2009) and Carmona (2009)
are obtained by showing that any game that satisfies the conditions of any of these
results can be suitably approximated by a particular well-behaved game, which differs
from the original only in the players’ payoff functions. In contrast, weak better-
reply security allows for any appropriately close well-behaved game to serve as an
approximation of the original game. Despite this apparent extra generality, we show
that there is a best possible approximation leading to weak better-reply security
and that it coincides with the approximation implicit in the notion of generalized
better-reply security of Barelli and Soza (2009). This characterization of weak better
reply-security establishes the equivalence between our existence result and that of
Barelli and Soza (2009). We also show that the approximation implicit in the notion
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of better-reply security of Reny (1999) is the best possible approximation leading to
weak better-reply security under the additional requirement that the approximating
game be payoff secure. Finally, we characterize the class of weak better-reply secure
games that dispense with the need for approximation and show that they include
those that satisfy the conditions in Carmona (2009).
Although our general existence result does not cover the results of Radzik (1991),
Ziad (1997) and Carmona (2010), the techniques of these papers can be combined with
the ones of this paper to obtain a new existence result. This new result establishes the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in games where players’ action spaces are polytopes
and players’ payoff functions are locally joint quasiconcave, weakly reciprocal upper
semicontinuous at all strategies that are not a Nash equilibrium and have continuous
value functions.
The interest of this new existence result can be understood as follows. Note
first that compact, quasiconcave, weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous and weakly
payoff secure (i.e., with lower semicontinuous value functions) games may fail to have a
Nash equilibrium (see Carmona (2009)). Note also that if each player’s value function
is locally polyhedral quasi-concave, then it is also upper semicontinuous. Hence, the
above existence result can be understood as providing strengthened quasiconcavity
conditions that are sufficient to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in weakly
reciprocal upper semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure games.
We note that our approach is a synthesis of several recent developments in the
literature.1 The idea of approximating the original game by a better behaved game is
based on Reny (1999) and the approximation of players’ value functions is achieved
using Reny’s approximation lemma. Furthermore, our sufficient condition for the
existence of equilibrium is inspired by Reny’s better-reply security. The idea of ap-
proximating players’ value functions in the approximating game and of applying a
fixed point to a subcorrespondence of the resulting approximate best-reply corre-
spondence is based on Prokopovych (2010). The application of a fixed point theorem
1See also Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) and Lebrun (1996) for early developments of similar
ideas.
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to a subcorrespondence of the approximate best-reply correspondence requires, first,
allowing players to use a well-behaved correspondence defined locally to secure payoffs
and, second, using a partition of the unity to obtain, from the well-behaved corre-
spondences defined locally, a well-behaved correspondence defined globally; both of
these ideas are based on Barelli and Soza (2009). Finally, the idea that limit points of
approximate equilibria of the approximating game are themselves Nash equilibria of
the original game is based on Bagh (2009), Carmona (2009) and Prokopovych (2010).
The strength of our approach is that these ideas are organized in such a way that it
allows for a general existence result based on (simple generalizations of) classic ideas
and which is strong enough to imply several known existence theorems. This, in turn,
allows for a clear understanding of both the new and the previous existence results.
Finally, we note that our approach leaves out the existence results based on the
existence of a maximal element of binary relations, such as the one of Baye, Tian,
and Zhou (1993).2 A unifying approach to both these and the existence results we
have focused on can be found in Barelli and Soza (2009). Moreover, our approach
also leaves out the existence results of Simon and Zame (1990) and Jackson, Simon,
Swinkels, and Zame (2002) for games with endogenous sharing rules. Although it
would be interesting to have a sufficiently general existence theorem to include all
such results, we stress that our goal is simply to show that several of them can be
obtained by an appropriate generalization of classical ideas.
2 Notation and Definitions
A normal form game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N consists of a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}
and, for all players i ∈ N , a pure strategy space Xi and a payoff function ui : X → R,
where X =
∏
i∈N Xi. We assume that, for all i ∈ N , Xi is a subset of a locally convex
2The existence theorem in Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) can be easily proven by applying Theorem
2 in Tian (1993) on the existence of maximal elements to the binary relation on the joint action
space defined by x Â y if and only if U(x, y) > U(y, y), where U(x, y) =∑i∈N ui(xi, y−i) in a game
G = (Xi, ui)i∈N .
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metric vector space.
We say that a game G is compact if, for all i ∈ N , Xi is compact and ui is
bounded. Given a player i ∈ N , the symbol −i denotes “all players but i”. Also,
X−i =
∏
j 6=iXj. Furthermore, we say that G is quasiconcave if, for all i ∈ N , Xi is
convex and ui(·, x−i) is quasiconcave for all x−i ∈ X−i.
Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a game and let, for all i ∈ N , vi : X−i → R be defined by
vi(x−i) = supxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i); the function vi is player i’s value function. A strategy
x∗ ∈ X is Nash equilibrium if ui(x∗) ≥ vi(x∗−i) for all i ∈ N .
We define the notion of an approximate equilibrium by replacing, in the inequality
above, vi with a function strictly below it. Let F (G) denote the set of all functions
f = (f1, . . . , fn) such that fi is a real-valued function on X−i and fi(x−i) < vi(x−i)
for all x−i ∈ X−i and i ∈ N . For all f ∈ F (G), we say a strategy x∗ ∈ X is an
f -equilibrium if ui(x
∗) ≥ fi(x∗−i) for all i ∈ N . Note that this notion generalizes the
concept of ε-equilibrium since, for all ε > 0, x∗ ∈ X is an ε-equilibrium if it is an
f -equilibrium for f = (v1 − ε, . . . , vn − ε).
3 Existence of Nash equilibrium
Below we establish a general existence result (Subsection 3.1). Minimal assumptions
for this result are obtained in Subsection 3.2. The general existence result of Subsec-
tion 3.1 and its version with minimal assumptions is used, in the case where players’
action spaces are metric and locally convex, to derive and understand the main re-
sults of Reny (1999) and Carmona (2009), and the generalization of Reny’s Theorem
obtained by Barelli and Soza (2009) (Subsection 3.3). In particular, it is shown that
our existence result is equivalent to the one of Barelli and Soza (2009). Further-
more, our existence result is used to establish the existence of Nash equilibrium in
weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure games that satisfy
strengthened quasiconcavity assumptions.
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3.1 A general existence result
Our general existence result (Theorem 1 below) states that all compact and quasicon-
cave games satisfying a weak form of better-reply security have a Nash equilibrium.
Our notion of weak better-reply security guarantees that any game satisfying it
can be approximated by a well-behaved game (in the sense that a fixed point argu-
ment can be used to establish the existence of approximate equilibria) and that the
approximation can be done in such a way that limit points of approximate equilibria
of the approximating game, with the level of approximation suitably converging to
zero, are themselves Nash equilibria of the original game.
Weak better-reply security combines two properties. The first is entitled better-
reply closedness. This property is the one responsible for the limit result and is for-
mally defined as follows. Let u be a Rn-valued function onX, vi(x−i) = supxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i)
for all i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a game and Γ be the closure of the
graph of u = (u1, . . . , un). We say that G is better-reply closed relative to u if ui ≤ ui
for all i ∈ N and if (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ and u∗i ≥ vi(x∗−i) for all i ∈ N imply that x∗ is a
Nash equilibrium of G. In this case, we say that G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is an approximating
game of G.
The second property that weak better-reply security incorporates is a general-
ization of the notion of generalized payoff security introduced by Barelli and Soza
(2009). This property is responsible for the existence of approximate equilibria for
any approximating game with a level of approximation suitably converging to zero.
A game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is generalized payoff secure if for all i ∈ N , ε > 0 and
x ∈ X there exists an open neighborhood Vx−i of x−i and an upper hemicontinuous
correspondence ϕi : Vx−i ⇒ Xi with nonempty, closed and convex values such that
ui(x
′) ≥ ui(x)− ε for all x′ ∈ graph(ϕi). Given a Rn-valued function u on X, a game
G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is generalized payoff secure relative to u if, for all i ∈ N , ui(·, x−i) is
quasiconcave for all x−i ∈ X−i and G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is generalized payoff secure.3
3In previous versions of this paper, we allowed players to secure payoffs in G with a lower hemi-
continuous correspondence, also with nonempty, closed and convex values. However, this extra
generality is only apparent. Because such correspondence takes values in a compact, hence complete
7
The notion of weak better-reply security combines generalized payoff security and
better-reply closedness. Formally, a game G is weakly better-reply secure if there
exists a bounded Rn-valued function u on X such that G is both generalized payoff
secure and better-reply closed relative to u. In this case, we also say that G is weakly
better-reply secure relative to u.
Our existence result states that compact, quasiconcave games that are weakly
better-reply secure have a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 If G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is compact, quasiconcave and weakly better-reply se-
cure, then G has a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 is established with the help of three lemmas. The first of these lemmas
states that if G is compact, quasiconcave and generalized payoff secure relative to a
bounded u, then the approximating game G has an f -equilibrium provided that f is
continuous. Note that, under those assumptions, G is a compact, quasiconcave and
generalized payoff secure game. Thus, Lemma 1 can be understood as stating that
every compact, quasiconcave and generalized payoff secure game has an f -equilibrium
for all continuous f . When stated in this way it becomes clear that Lemma 1 is a
generalization of Reny (1996, Theorem 3) and Prokopovych (2010, Theorem 2) since
the assumption of payoff security used in these results is replaced by generalized payoff
security.
Lemma 1 Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a compact and quasiconcave game. If G is general-
ized payoff secure relative to a bounded u, then G = (Xi, ui)i∈N has an f -equilibrium
for all continuous f ∈ F (G).
Proof. Since u is bounded, so is v. Hence, F (G) is nonempty and, in fact, there
exist continuous functions f ∈ F (G). Let f be such a function and define B : X ⇒ X
subset of a metric space, it follows by Michael’s selection theorem (see Theorem 17.66 in Aliprantis
and Border (2006) and its proof) that it has a continuous selection. This implies that players can
secure payoffs with the upper hemicontinuous correspondence with nonempty, closed and convex
values defined by such continuous selection.
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by B(x) = {y ∈ X : ui(yi, x−i) > fi(x−i) for all i ∈ N}. Note that B is nonempty-
valued since fi < vi for all i ∈ N and is convex-valued since ui(·, x−i) is quasiconcave
for all i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i.
Next, we show that for all x ∈ X, there exist an open neighborhood Vx of x and
an upper hemicontinuous correspondence ϕx : Vx ⇒ X with nonempty, closed and
convex values such that ϕx(x
′) ⊆ B(x′) for all x′ ∈ Vx.
In order to establish the above claim, let x ∈ X and consider y ∈ B(x). Then,
for all i ∈ N , ui(yi, x−i) > fi(x−i) + 2η for some η > 0 sufficiently small. Since G is
generalized payoff secure and f is continuous, it follows that for all i ∈ N , there exist
an open neighborhood Vx−i of x−i and an upper hemicontinuous correspondence ϕi :
Vx−i ⇒ Xi with nonempty, closed and convex values such that ui(x′) ≥ ui(yi, x−i)−η
for all x′ ∈ graph(ϕi) and fi(x−i) > fi(x′−i) − η for all x′−i ∈ Vx−i . Define, for all
i ∈ N , Vi = Xi × Vx−i , V = ∩i∈NVi and ϕ : V ⇒ X by ϕ(x′) =
∏
i∈N ϕi(x
′
−i) for all
x′ ∈ V . Let x′ ∈ V and y′ ∈ ϕ(x′). Then, for all i ∈ N , it follows that x′−i ∈ Vx−i and
y′i ∈ ϕi(x′−i). Then ui(y′i, x′−i) ≥ ui(yi, x−i)− η > fi(x−i) + η > fi(x′−i) for all i ∈ N .
Hence, y′ ∈ B(x′) and so ϕ(x′) ⊆ B(x′).
In the light of the above claim, we obtain a family {Vx}x∈X where Vx is an
open neighborhood of x, and a family {ϕx}x∈X where ϕx : Vx ⇒ X is an upper
hemicontinuous correspondence with nonempty, closed and convex values satisfying
ϕx(x
′) ⊆ B(x′) for all x′ ∈ Vx. Since X is compact, there exists a finite open
cover {Vxj}mj=1 and a partition of the unity {βj}mj=1 subordinate to {Vxj}mj=1. De-
fine φ : X ⇒ X by φ(x) =
∑m
j=1 βj(x)ϕxj(x). Then, it is easy to see that φ is
an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with nonempty, closed and convex values.
Thus, φ has a fixed point x∗ by the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem (see
Aliprantis and Border (2006, Corollary 17.55)).
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ m be given and note that if x∗ ∈ Vxj , then ϕxj(x∗) ⊆ B(x∗)
while if x∗ 6∈ Vxj , then βj(x∗) = 0. Since B is convex-valued, then x∗ = φ(x∗) =∑
j:βj(x∗)>0 βj(x
∗)ϕxj(x
∗) ∈ B(x∗). Hence, for all i ∈ N , ui(x∗) > fi(x∗−i) and so x∗ is
an f -equilibrium of G.
Lemma 2 also concerns generalized payoff secure games. It states that if a game G
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is generalized payoff secure relative to a bounded u, then each player’s value function
in the approximating game G is lower semicontinuous.
Lemma 2 If G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is generalized payoff secure relative to a bounded u,
then vi is lower semicontinuous for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Since u is bounded, it follows that vi is real-valued for all i ∈ N . Let
i ∈ N , x−i ∈ X−i and ε > 0 be given. Let 0 < η < ε and let xi ∈ Xi be such that
ui(xi, x−i)− η > vi(x−i)− ε. Since G is generalized payoff secure relative to u, there
exists an open neighborhood Vx−i of x−i and a nonempty-valued correspondence ϕi :
Vx−i ⇒ Xi such that ui(x′) ≥ ui(x)−η for all x′ ∈ graph(ϕi). Then, for all x′−i ∈ Vx−i ,
letting x′i ∈ ϕi(x′−i), we obtain that vi(x′−i) ≥ ui(x′) ≥ ui(x)−η > vi(x−i)−ε. Hence,
vi is lower semicontinuous.
Since vi is lower semicontinuous for all i ∈ N , it follows by Reny (1999, Lemma
3.5) that there exists a sequence {vki }∞k=1 of continuous real-valued functions on X−i
such that vki (x−i) ≤ vi(x−i) and lim infk vki (xk−i) ≥ vi(x−i) for all k ∈ N, i ∈ N ,
x−i ∈ X−i and all sequences {xk−i}∞k=1 converging to x−i. When G is a compact
game, this form of approximation together with better-reply closedness relative to a
bounded u is enough for every limit point of every sequence of approximate equilibria
of G to be a Nash equilibrium of G.
Lemma 3 Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a compact and better-reply closed game relative to a
bounded u. If x∗ ∈ X, {xk}∞k=1 ⊆ X and {fk}∞k=1 ⊆ F (G) are such that x∗ = limk xk,
lim infk f
k
i (x
k
−i) ≥ vi(x∗−i) for all i ∈ N and xk is a fk-equilibrium of G = (Xi, ui)i∈N
for all k ∈ N, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. Since u is bounded, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume
that {u(xk)}∞k=1 converges. Let u∗ = limk u(xk) and note that (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ.
Let i ∈ N . Since xk is a fk-equilibrium of G for all k ∈ N, then ui(xk) ≥ ui(xk) ≥
fki (x
k
−i) for all k ∈ N, and so lim infk fki (xk−i) ≥ vi(x∗−i) implies that u∗i ≥ vi(x∗−i).
Since u∗i ≥ vi(x∗−i) for all i ∈ N and G is better-reply closed relative to u, it follows
that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
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We finally turn to the proof of Theorem 1, which is obtained easily from Lemmas
1—3.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let u be a bounded Rn-valued function on X such that
G is both generalized payoff secure and better-reply closed relative to u.
For all k ∈ N and i ∈ N , let fki : X−i → R be defined by fki (x−i) = vki (x−i)− 1/k
for all x−i ∈ X−i, where {vki }∞k=1 is a sequence of continuous real-valued functions
on X−i such that vki (x−i) ≤ vi(x−i) and lim infk vki (xk−i) ≥ vi(x−i) for all k ∈ N,
i ∈ N , x−i ∈ X−i and all sequences {xk−i}∞k=1 converging to x−i (as remarked above,
the existence of this sequence follows from Lemma 2 and Reny (1999, Lemma 3.5)).
Since fk is continuous and f
k
i < vi for all i ∈ N , Lemma 1 implies that G = (Xi, ui)i∈N
has a fk-equilibrium, xk, for all k ∈ N.
Since X is compact, we may assume that {xk}∞k=1 converges. Letting x∗ = limk xk,
we have that lim infk f
k
i (x
k
−i) ≥ vi(x∗−i) for all i ∈ N and Lemma 3 implies that x∗ is
a Nash equilibrium of G.
3.2 Minimal Weak Better-Reply Security
Weak better-reply security requires players’ payoff functions to be suitably approxi-
mated from below. In this subsection, we show in Theorem 2 below that there exists
a best possible approximation. This means that only one (bounded, Rn-valued) func-
tion needs to be considered when checking for weak better-reply security because it
yields the weakest form of weak better-reply security.
The function that characterizes weak better-reply security is defined as follows:
For all i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, let N(x−i) denote the set of all open neighborhoods
of x−i. Furthermore, for all i ∈ N , x ∈ X and U ∈ N(x−i), let WU(x) be the set of
all upper hemicontinuous correspondences ϕi : U ⇒ Xi with nonempty, convex and
closed values that satisfy x ∈ graph(ϕi). For all i ∈ N and x ∈ X, define
uui (x) = sup
U∈N(x−i)
sup
ϕi∈WU (x)
inf
z∈graph(ϕi)
ui(z).
Theorem 2 shows that weak better-reply security relative to uu is the minimal
form of weak better-reply security. Furthermore, it shows that weak better-reply
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security relative to uu amounts to better-reply closedness relative to uu.
Theorem 2 Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a compact and quasiconcave game. Then, the
following conditions are equivalent:
1. G is weakly better-reply secure.
2. G is weakly better-reply secure relative to uu.
3. G is better-reply closed relative to uu.
Theorem 2 is obtained from Lemma 4 below. This lemma shows that uu approx-
imates u from below and yields a generalized payoff secure game Gu = (Xi, u
u
i )i∈N .
Furthermore, Lemma 4 also shows that the value function vui of u
u
i , i ∈ N , is the
pointwise supremum of the set of value functions vi defined from the functions u that
approximate u from below and yield generalized payoff secure games. In other words,
if u, like uu, approximates u from below and yields a generalized payoff secure game,
then, for all i ∈ N , the value function vi of ui is (everywhere) below the value function
vui of u
u
i . The following notation is used in its statement. Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be
a game and define L(G) as the set of all bounded functions u : X → Rn such that
ui ≤ ui for all i ∈ N and G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is generalized payoff secure.
Lemma 4 Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a compact and quasiconcave game. Then, uu ∈
L(G) and vui (x−i) ≥ supxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i) for all u ∈ L(G), i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i.
Proof. We first show that uu ∈ L(G). Since u is bounded, so is uu. Note
that ui(x) ≥ uui (x) for all i ∈ N and x ∈ X. In fact, for all U ∈ N(x−i) and
ϕi ∈ WU(xi, x−i), we have that x ∈ graph(ϕi). Thus, infz∈graph(ϕi) ui(z) ≤ ui(x) and
so uui (x) ≤ ui(x).
We next show that uui (·, x−i) is quasiconcave for all i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i. Let
α ∈ R, xi, x′i ∈ {yi ∈ Xi : uui (yi, x−i) > α} and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then, there exist U,U ′ ∈
N(x−i), ϕi ∈ WU(xi, x−i) and ϕ′i ∈ WU ′(x′i, x−i) such that infz∈graph(ϕi) ui(z) > α and
infz∈graph(ϕ′i) ui(z) > α.
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Define x¯i = λxi+ (1− λ)x′i, U¯ = U ∩U ′ and ϕ¯i = λϕi+ (1− λ)ϕ′i in U¯ . It follows
that U¯ is an open neighborhood of x−i and x¯i ∈ ϕ¯i(x−i). Furthermore, it is easy to
see that ϕ¯i is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty, convex and closed values. Hence,
U¯ ∈ N(x−i) and ϕ¯i ∈ WU¯(x¯i, x−i).
Let z¯ ∈ graph(ϕ¯i). Then, there exist zi ∈ ϕi(z¯−i) and z′i ∈ ϕ′i(z¯−i) such that
z¯i = λzi + (1− λ)z′i. The quasiconcavity of ui(·, z¯−i) implies that
ui(z¯) ≥ min{ui(zi, z¯−i), ui(z′i, z¯−i)} ≥ min
{
inf
y∈graph(ϕi)
ui(y), inf
y∈graph(ϕ′i)
ui(y)
}
> α.
Hence, uui (x¯i, x−i) ≥ infz∈graph(ϕ¯i) ui(z) > α. Thus, x¯i = λxi + (1− λ)x′i ∈ {yi ∈ Xi :
uui (yi, x−i) > α}, proving that uui (·, x−i) is quasiconcave.
Finally, we show that Gu = (Xi, u
u
i )i∈N is generalized payoff secure. Let i ∈
N , ε > 0 and x ∈ X. Then, there exists U ∈ N(x−i) and ϕi ∈ WU(x) such
that infz∈graph(ϕi) ui(z) > u
u
i (x) − ε. Then, for all x′ ∈ graph(ϕi), we have that
x′−i ∈ U and x′i ∈ ϕi(x′−i), that is, U ∈ N(x′−i) and ϕi ∈ WU(x′). Thus, uui (x′) ≥
infz∈graph(ϕi) ui(z) > u
u
i (x)− ε.
We next establish that vui (x−i) ≥ vi(x−i) for all u ∈ L(G), i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i,
where vi(x−i) = supxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i). Let u ∈ L(G), i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X be fixed.
Also, let ε > 0 and xi ∈ Xi be given. Since u ∈ L(G), then there exists U ∈ N(x−i)
and a upper hemicontinuous correspondence ϕi : U ⇒ Xi with nonempty, convex and
closed values such that ui(z) ≥ ui(x)− ε for all z ∈ graph(ϕi). Let x′i ∈ ϕi(x−i) and
note that ϕi ∈ WU(x′i, x−i). Since ui ≥ ui, then
vui (x−i) ≥ uui (x′i, x−i) ≥ inf
z∈graph(ϕi)
ui(z) ≥ inf
z∈graph(ϕi)
ui(z) ≥ ui(x)− ε
and so vui (x) ≥ ui(x)− ε. Since ε > 0 and xi are arbitrary, then vui (x−i) ≥ vi(x−i).
Theorem 2 follows easily from Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is clear that condition 2 implies both condition 1 and
condition 3. Hence, it suffices to show that condition 2 is implied by each one of the
two remaining conditions.
Suppose that G is weakly better-reply secure relative to u. Then, G is generalized
payoff secure relative to u and so G = (Xi, u)i∈N is generalized payoff secure. Since
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uu ∈ L(G), it follows that Gu = (Xi, uui )i∈N is generalized payoff secure and so G is
generalized payoff secure relative to uu. Furthermore, uu ∈ L(G) also implies that
uui ≤ ui for all i ∈ N and, by Lemma 4, we have that vi ≤ vui for all i ∈ N . Hence,
if (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ is such that u∗i ≥ vui (x∗−i) for all i ∈ N , then u∗i ≥ vi(x∗−i) for all i ∈ N
and so x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G since G is better-reply closed relative to u. Thus,
G is weakly better-reply secure relative to uu.
Suppose that G is better-reply closed relative to uu. Since uu ∈ L(G), it follows
that G is generalized payoff secure relative to uu and thus that G is weakly better-
reply secure relative to uu.
3.3 Corollaries of the general existence result
When players’ action spaces are metric and locally convex, Theorem 1 allows us to
obtain the existence results of Reny (1999, Theorem 3.1), Carmona (2009, Corollary
2) and Barelli and Soza (2009, Corollary 6.8). In fact, we show that all of these results
provide sufficient conditions for a game to be weakly better reply-secure relative to a
particular choice of a bounded Rn-function u on X.
The result in Barelli and Soza (2009) is the most general of the above results. It
considers generalized better-reply secure games, which are defined as follows. A game
G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is generalized better-reply secure if whenever (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ and x∗ is
not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player i ∈ N , an open neighborhood U of x∗−i, a
upper hemicontinuous correspondence ϕi : U ⇒ Xi with nonempty, closed and convex
values, and a number αi > u
∗
i such that ui(x
′) ≥ αi for all x′ ∈ graph(ϕi). Theorem 3
shows that generalized better-reply security is equivalent to weak better-reply security
relative to uu and, by Theorem 2, equivalent to weak better-reply security.
Theorem 3 Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a compact and quasiconcave game. Then, G is
weakly better-reply secure relative to uu if and only if G is generalized better-reply
secure.
Proof. (Necessity) Suppose that G is weakly better-reply secure relative to uu
and let (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ be such that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium. Since G is better-
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reply closed relative to uu, it follows that there is i ∈ N such that vui (x∗−i) > u∗i .
Hence, there exists αi > u
∗
i and xi ∈ Xi such that uui (xi, x∗−i) > αi. This in turn
implies that there exist U ∈ N(x∗−i) and ϕi ∈ WU(xi, x∗−i) such that ui(z) > αi for all
z ∈ graph(ϕi). Thus, G is generalized better-reply secure.
(Sufficiency) Since uu ∈ L(G), it follows that ui ≥ uui for all i ∈ N and that G is
generalized payoff secure relative to uu. Consider (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ such that vui (x∗−i) ≤ u∗i
for all i ∈ N , and, in order to reach a contradiction, suppose that x∗ is not a Nash
equilibrium of G. By generalized better-reply security, there exist i ∈ N , U ∈ N(x∗−i),
an upper hemicontinuous correspondence ϕi : U ⇒ Xi with nonempty, convex and
closed values and αi > u
∗
i such that ui(z) ≥ αi for all z ∈ graph(ϕi). Let xi ∈ ϕi(x∗−i).
Then, ϕi ∈ WU(xi, x∗−i) and so vui (x∗−i) ≥ uui (xi, x∗−i) ≥ infz∈graph(ϕi) ui(z) ≥ αi > u∗i .
This is a contradiction. Hence, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G. Thus, G is better-reply
closed relative to uu and so G is weakly better-reply secure relative to uu.
Theorem 3 allow us to obtain Corollary 6.8 in Barelli and Soza (2009) immediately
from Theorem 1. In fact, these two results are equivalent.
Corollary 1 (Barelli and Soza) If G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is compact, quasiconcave and
generalized better-reply secure, then it has a Nash equilibrium.
Reny’s existence theorem establishes the existence of Nash equilibria in better-
reply games, which are defined as follows. A game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is better-reply
secure if whenever (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ and x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player
i ∈ N , a strategy x¯i ∈ Xi, an open neighborhood U of x∗−i and a number αi > u∗i
such that ui(x¯i, x
′
−i) ≥ αi for all x′−i ∈ U .
Better-reply security can be characterized in terms of weak better-reply security
relative to a particular function u. Furthermore, as Theorem 4 below shows, Theorem
3.1 in Reny (1999) is the best existence result based on weak better-reply security
under the requirement that the approximating games be payoff secure.
Given a compact and quasiconcave game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N , let up : X → Rn be
defined by
upi (x) = sup
U∈N(x−i)
inf
z−i∈U
ui(xi, z−i)
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for all i ∈ N and x ∈ X. Also, let Lp(G) be the set of all bounded functions
u : X → Rn such that ui ≤ ui for all i ∈ N and G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is payoff secure.
Analogously to Lemma 4, we have that up ∈ Lp(G) and vpi (x−i) ≥ supxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i)
for all u ∈ Lp(G), i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i. In fact, letting, for all i ∈ N , x ∈ X
and U ∈ N(x−i), W pU(x) be the set of all singleton-valued constant correspondences
ϕi : U ⇒ Xi satisfying x ∈ graph(ϕi), we can write
upi (x) = sup
U∈N(x−i)
sup
ϕi∈W pU (x)
inf
z∈graph(ϕi)
ui(z)
for all i ∈ N and x ∈ X (sinceW pU(x) = {ϕˆi}, where ϕˆi ≡ {xi}). The conclusion then
follows from (a simple adaptation of) the arguments used in the proof of Lemma 4.
Theorem 4 Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a compact and quasiconcave game. Then, G is
weakly better-reply secure relative to up if and only if G is better-reply secure.
Proof. (Necessity) Suppose that G is weakly better-reply secure relative to up
and let (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ be such that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium. Since G is better-reply
closed relative to up, it follows that there is i ∈ N such that vpi (x∗−i) > u∗i . Hence,
there exists αi > u
∗
i and xi ∈ Xi such that upi (xi, x∗−i) > αi. This in turn implies
that there exist a U ∈ N(x∗−i) such that ui(xi, z−i) > αi for all z−i ∈ U . Thus, G is
better-reply secure.
(Sufficiency) Since up ∈ Lp(G), it follows that ui ≥ upi for all i ∈ N and that
G is generalized payoff secure relative to up (in fact, Gp = (Xi, u
p
i )i∈N is generalized
payoff secure since W pU(x) ⊆ WU(x) for all i ∈ N , x ∈ X and U ∈ N(x−i)). Consider
(x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ such that vpi (x∗−i) ≤ u∗i for all i ∈ N , and, in order to reach a contra-
diction, suppose that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium of G. By better-reply security,
there exist i ∈ N , U ∈ N(x∗−i), xi ∈ Xi and αi > u∗i such that ui(xi, z−i) ≥ αi for all
z−i ∈ U . Thus, vpi (x∗−i) ≥ upi (xi, x∗−i) ≥ infz−i∈U ui(xi, z−i) ≥ αi > u∗i , a contradiction.
Hence, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G. Thus, G is better-reply closed relative to up
and so G is weakly better-reply secure relative to up.
Theorem 4 allows us to obtain Reny’s Theorem from Theorem 1.
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Corollary 2 (Reny) If G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is compact, quasiconcave and better-reply
secure, then it has a Nash equilibrium.
Some existence results, such as Corollaries 3 and 4 below, are particularly simple
because there is no need to approximate the original game, i.e., we can have u = u.
Theorem 5 below characterizes those games G = (Xi, ui)i∈N that are weakly better-
reply secure relative to u. This result is then used to obtain the existence result of
Carmona (2009) and a new existence result based on the ideas of Radzik (1991), Ziad
(1997) and Carmona (2010). Part of the characterization relies on the notion of weak
upper semicontinuity introduced by Bagh and Jofre (2006). A game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N
is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous if for all (x, α) in the frontier of the graph of
u, there exists i ∈ N and xˆi ∈ Xi such that ui(xˆi, x−i) > αi. Moreover, for all x ∈ X,
we say that G is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous at x if for all α ∈ Rn such
that (x, α) is in the frontier of the graph of u, there exists i ∈ N and xˆi ∈ Xi such
that ui(xˆi, x−i) > αi. Note that, clearly, G is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous
if and only if it is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous at x for all x ∈ X.
Theorem 5 Let G = (Xi, ui)i∈N be a compact and quasiconcave game. Then, G is
weakly better-reply secure relative to u if and only if G is generalized payoff secure and
weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous at x∗ for all x∗ that are not Nash equilibria of
G.
Proof. By definition, G is weakly better-reply secure relative to u if and only if
G is generalized payoff secure and better-reply closed relative to u. Thus, it suffices
to show that G is better-reply closed relative to u if and only if G is weakly reciprocal
upper semicontinuous at x∗ for all x∗ that are not Nash equilibria of G.
Suppose that G is better-reply closed relative to u. Let (x∗, u∗) be in the frontier
of graph(u) and be such that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium of G. Then, in particular,
(x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ and better-reply closedness relative to u implies that there is i ∈ N such
that vi(x
∗
−i) > u
∗
i . Hence, there is an xi ∈ Xi such that ui(xi, x∗−i) > u∗i . Thus, G is
weak reciprocally upper semicontinuous at x∗.
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Conversely, suppose that G is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous at x∗ for all
x∗ that are not Nash equilibria of G. Let (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ be such that u∗i ≥ vi(x∗−i) for all
i ∈ N . If x∗ is not an equilibrium, then there is a j ∈ N such that vj(x∗−j) > uj(x∗)
and so u∗j > uj(x
∗). This implies that (x∗, u∗) belongs to the frontier of graph(u).
Since G is weak reciprocally upper semicontinuous at x∗, then there is an i ∈ N such
that u∗i < vi(x
∗
−i), a contradiction. Hence, x
∗ is a Nash equilibrium and G better-reply
closed relative to u.
Carmona (2009) established an existence result independent of that of Reny (1999)
and which is valid for games that are weakly upper semicontinuous and weakly payoff
secure. Formally, a game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is weakly payoff secure if vi is lower semi-
continuous for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, G is weakly upper semicontinuous if, defining
u¯ : X×X → Rn by u¯(x, y) = (u1(x1, y−1), . . . , un(xn, y−n)), then for all (x, y, α) in the
frontier of the graph of u¯, there exists i ∈ N and xˆi ∈ Xi such that ui(xˆi, y−i) > αi.
The result in Carmona (2009) is obtained from Theorem 1 by using u = u, that is,
by combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 5. In fact, in compact, quasiconcave, weakly
upper semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure games, the best-reply correspondence
is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty, convex and closed values and it can used to
secure players’ payoffs.
Corollary 3 (Carmona) If G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is compact, quasiconcave, weakly upper
semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure, then it has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first show that G is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous. Let
(x∗, u∗) be in the frontier of the graph of u. Then, for some i ∈ N , (x∗, u∗i ) belongs to
the closure of the graph of ui and it follows from Carmona (2009, Theorem 1) that
there exists xˆi ∈ Xi such that ui(xˆi, x∗−i) > u∗i .
Finally, we show that G is generalized payoff secure. Let i ∈ N , ε > 0 and x ∈ X.
Let BRi : X−i ⇒ Xi be defined by BRi(x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi, x−i) = vi(x−i)}
for all x−i ∈ X−i. Since vi is lower semicontinuous, let U ∈ N(x−i) be such that
vi(x
′
−i) > vi(x−i) − ε and define ϕi(x′−i) = BRi(x′−i) for all x′−i ∈ U . Then, ϕi is
an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with nonempty, closed and convex values
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(Carmona (2009, Theorem 1)) and, for all x′ ∈ graph(ϕi), we have that ui(x′) =
vi(x
′
−i) > vi(x−i)− ε ≥ ui(x)− ε.
Theorem 1 also allows us to obtain an existence result using some ideas from
Radzik (1991), Ziad (1997) and Carmona (2010). We say that a game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N
is weakly continuous if vi is continuous for all i ∈ N . The following notions strengthen
the usual quasiconcavity assumption. A game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is locally joint quasi-
concave if for all i ∈ N and x ∈ X, Xi is a polytope (and so a subset of an Euclidean
space) and there exists an open neighborhood Vx−i of x−i such that ui is quasicon-
cave in Xi × Vx−i . The upper semicontinuity of each player’s value function can be
obtained by strengthening the previous notion, as follows. A game G = (Xi, ui)i∈N
is strongly quasiconcave if G is locally joint quasiconcave and for all i ∈ N and
x−i ∈ X−i, there exists an open neighborhood Vx−i of x−i such that vi is polyhe-
dral quasiconcave in Vx−i (i.e., for all α ∈ R, there exists a polytope P such that
{x′−i ∈ Vx−i : vi(x′−i) ≥ α} = P ∩ Vx−i).
Corollary 4 If G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is compact, locally joint quasiconcave, better-reply
closed relative to u and weakly continuous, then it has a Nash equilibrium.
In particular, if G = (Xi, ui)i∈N is compact, strongly quasiconcave, weakly recip-
rocal upper semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure, then it has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Clearly, since G is locally joint quasiconcave, then G is quasiconcave.
Thus, it suffices to show that G is generalized payoff secure.
Let i ∈ N , ε > 0 and x ∈ X. Let 0 < η < ε/2 and, for all α > 0, let Bα(x−i)
denote the open ball of radius α around x−i with respect to the sup norm of the
Euclidean space containing X−i. In particular, note that the closure of Bα(x−i) is a
polytope.
Since vi is continuous and ui is locally quasiconcave, there is δ > 0 such that ui
is quasiconcave in Xi × (X−i ∩Bδ(x−i)) and |vi(x′−i)− vi(xˆ−i)| < η for all x′−i, xˆ−i ∈
X−i ∩ Bδ(x−i). Let U = X−i ∩ Bδ/2(x−i) and note that P := X−i ∩ Bδ/2(x−i) is
contained in X−i ∩Bδ(x−i).
Since P is a polytope, let x0−i, . . . , x
m
−i ∈ P be such that P = co({x0−i, . . . , xm−i}).
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For convenience, let x¯−i = (x0−i, . . . , x
m
−i). Consider the correspondence Θi : U ⇒ ∆m
defined by Θi(z−i) = {θ ∈ ∆m : z−i = θ · x¯−i} for all z−i ∈ U , where ∆m = {θ ∈
Rm+1 :
∑m
j=0 θj = 1 and θj ≥ 0 for all j}.
For all j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, let xji ∈ Xi be such that ui(xji , xj−i) > vi(xj−i) − ε/2 + η
and let x¯i = (x
0
i , . . . , x
m
i ). Define ϕi : U ⇒ Xi by ϕi(z−i) = {θ · x¯i : θ ∈ Θi(z−i)} for
all z−i ∈ U . It is easy to show that ϕi is upper hemicontinuous and has nonempty,
closed and convex values.
We claim that vi(x
′
−i) − ε/2 < ui(x′i, x′−i) for all x′i ∈ ϕi(x′−i) and x′−i ∈ U . If
not, then vi(x
′
−i) − ε/2 ≥ ui(x′i, x′−i) for some x′ ∈ graph(ϕi). Since x′i ∈ ϕi(x′−i),
then (x′i, x
′
−i) = θ · (x¯i, x¯−i) for some θ ∈ ∆m. The quasiconcavity of ui in Xi ×
(X−i ∩Bδ(x−i)) implies that
ui(x
′
i, x
′
−i) = ui(θ · (x¯i, x¯−i)) ≥ min
j
ui(x
j
i , x
j
−i) > min
j
vi(x
j
−i)− ε/2 + η.
Hence, vi(x
′
−i) > minj vi(x
j
−i) + η, a contradiction since x
′
−i, x
j
−i ∈ Bδ(x−i) for all j.
Thus, ϕi : U ⇒ Xi is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with nonempty,
closed and convex values and, for all x′ ∈ graph(ϕi), we have that ui(x′) > vi(x′−i)−
ε/2 > vi(x−i)− ε ≥ ui(x)− ε. Hence, G is generalized payoff secure.
Finally, note that if G is strongly quasiconcave, then vi is upper semicontinuous
for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, it follows from Theorem 5 that if G is weakly reciprocal
better-reply secure, then G is better-reply closed relative to u. Hence, all compact,
strongly quasiconcave, weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous and weakly payoff
secure games have a Nash equilibrium.
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